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In June 2008, Professor John G. Ruggie, the Special Representative of the United Nations
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises (Special Representative), presented the Protect, Respect and Remedy
Framework for Business and Human Rights (Protect, Respect, Remedy)1 to the United Nations
Human Rights Council. Protect, Respect, Remedy rests upon three complementary principles: the
state duty to protect against human rights abuses by non-state actors, including business; the
corporate responsibility to respect rights; and the need for greater access by victims to effective
remedy. Protect, Respect, Remedy was unanimously welcomed by member states of the Human
Rights Council, and the Special Representative was given a renewed three-year mandate to
provide concrete and practical recommendations for its implementation.2 His final report
consisted primarily of Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework (Guiding Principles) for the implementation of
Protect, Respect, Remedy.3 On June 16, 2011, the Guiding Principles, too, were unanimously
endorsed by the Human Rights Council, establishing for the first time an international standard,
or, in the words of the Special Representative, a “global reference point” for business and human
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rights.4 To move forward, the Council established a Working Group on business and human rights
for a three-year period, consisting of five independent experts representative of balanced
geographic regions.5 The Working Group is charged with, among other things, “promot[ing] the
effective and comprehensive dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles.”6
Evaluating the contributions of the Special Representative to the international business
and human rights agenda is an extensive proposition, due in part to the thousands of pages of
documentation assembled during the course of his mandate. The aim of this chapter is fairly
modest: to draw attention to the corporate law project undertaken during the Special
Representative’s mandate; to assess its implications for our understanding of the Guiding
Principles; and to propose an agenda for further research. Many have critiqued the Guiding
Principles for failing to mandate extraterritorial home state obligations, and for failing to impose
an internationally legally binding obligation on transnational corporations themselves, among
other issues.7 While in no way discounting the importance of access to remedy for victims of
human rights violations and the need to ensure that the “governance gaps” created by
globalization are closed, this chapter will suggest that equally important – and indeed part of the
solution – is grappling with the nature of the corporate enterprise itself. This chapter will assess
the contribution of the corporate law tools project toward this overarching objective.
The chapter will begin by outlining the process undertaken by the Special Representative
to inform his mandate and leading up to Protect, Respect, Remedy, with special attention to the
emergence of corporate law as a topic of interest. Secondly, both the process and substantive
conclusions of the corporate law project will be examined. The third part will explore the
relationship between the corporate law project and the substantive content of the 2011 Guiding
Principles. Finally, the chapter will conclude with some reflections on the process adopted to
inform the corporate law project for our understanding of international law relating to business
and human rights, and propose an agenda for future research.
The Ruggie Process
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John Ruggie described his 2005 appointment as Special Representative as being explicitly
designed to move the UN agenda beyond the stalemate produced by the Draft UN Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to
Human Rights.8 The Norms were the product of an expert group of the UN Sub-Commission on
Human Rights that were ultimately described by the UN Human Rights Commission in 2004 as a
draft proposal of no legal standing that contained “useful elements and ideas.”9 While civil society
groups endorsed the draft Norms, states and businesses did not.10 In the opinion of the Special
Representative, at the time of his appointment “there was little that counted as shared
knowledge across different stakeholder groups in the business and human rights domain”.11 As a
result, Ruggie began his work with what he has described as “an extensive programme of
systematic research,” resulting ultimately in “several thousand pages of documentation” available
on the internet and actively disseminated.12
The Special Representative’s mandate was informed by numerous multi-stakeholder
consultations. In the early days of the mandate, Ruggie held sectoral consultations with the
extractive sector13 and the financial sector,14 as well as regional consultations in Africa,15 Asia,16
and Latin America.17 These were held despite the limitations of working within an essentially unfunded mandate, supported by voluntary donations.18 Participants were geographically diverse
and included reasonably balanced representation from business and civil society, as well as
representatives of international organizations, governments and academia, among others. Ruggie
also held four legal expert consultations early on, focused on issues such as corporate
8
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responsibility under international law and extraterritorial regulation.19 However, the idea that it
might be useful to study corporate law itself was not evident in these early consultations.
Also in the early stages and in keeping with his mandate to “identify and clarify” existing
standards and practices, Ruggie conducted a “scientific mapping” of the position taken by the UN
Human Rights mechanisms with regard to the obligations of both states and corporations.
Summary conclusions of this mapping project were presented in his June 2007 UN Report.20
While the 2007 Report highlighted that “States have a duty to protect against non-State human
rights abuses within their jurisdiction,” a duty which extends to business entities and requires
States to take steps to “regulate and adjudicate abuses”,21 there was no explicit reference to the
idea that this state obligation might extend to the internal structures of corporate law itself.
Indeed, the only reference to corporate law in the 2007 Report is found within a section on “SelfRegulation” where, in discussing sustainability reporting, a footnote references new reporting
obligations for large listed companies in the United Kingdom.22
During the second half of 2007, five international multi-stakeholder consultations were
convened by the Special Representative together with non-governmental organizations in
support of the mandate. These consultations were designed to inform the substance of Protect,
Respect, Remedy.23 While three of the consultations did not allude to corporate law,24 the
beginnings of this project can be seen in the other two. For example, the consultation on the
Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights proposed the concept of “due diligence” as an
“overarching analytical framework” that could “guide corporate policies and management
practices” in relation to human rights.25 The consultation report explicitly links the concept of
due diligence to the discharge in the United States of company directors’ fiduciary duties of care
19

Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other multinational enterprises, Addendum: Corporate responsibility under international law and issues
in extraterritorial regulation: summary of legal workshops, UNHRC, 4th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/4/35/Add.2 (15 February
2007), online: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/108/45/PDF/G0710845.pdf?OpenElement The author
was fortunate to attend the New York legal workshop in November 2006.
20
Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts,
th
Human Rights Council 4 Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (19 February 2007) [2007 Report]. See also Report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises, John Ruggie, State responsibilities to regulate and adjudicate corporate activities under the United Nations
th
core human rights treaties: an overview of treaty body commentaries, Human Rights Council 4 Session, UN Doc.
A/HRC/4/35/Add.1 (13 February 2007) [State Responsibilities Addendum].
21
Ibid, 2007 Report at 5 (para 10).
22
Ibid, 2007 Report at 23 (para 78, footnote 62).
23
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, Summary of five multi-stakeholder consultations, Human Rights
th
Council 8 Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5/Add.1 (23 April 2008) at 2 [Consultations Addendum 2008]. The NGO partners
were the Danish section of the International Commission of Jurists (Copenhagen), ibid at 10 (para 6); Global Witness
(Berlin), ibid at 20 (para 68); Realizing Rights, the Ethical Globalization Initiative (Geneva), ibid at 26 (para 101); the
Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, ibid at 35 (para 154); and
the Clean Clothes Campaign (The Hague), ibid at 49 (para 220). Government and UN support also financed aspects of the
consultations.
24
See Business and Human Rights in Conflict Zones: The Role of Home States (Berlin Consultation), ibid at 20 (paras 6899); Corporations and Human Rights: Accountability Mechanisms for Resolving Complaints and Disputes, ibid at 35 (paras
153-218); and Improving the Human Rights Performance of Business through Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives, ibid at 48
(paras 219-260).
25
Consultations Addendum 2008, supra note 25 at 28 (para 111).
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and loyalty.26 The report also notes that the International Bar Association was researching how
these concepts are understood in various jurisdictions.27 In addition, according to the
consultation report, the United States Sentencing Guidelines define the corporate fiduciary duty
of care as “due diligence to ensure that companies are in compliance with both legal and ethical
guidelines,” which one participant believed included international human rights standards.28
The potential significance of corporate law was more directly identified during the
Copenhagen consultation relating to the Role of States in Effectively Regulating and Adjudicating
the Activities of Corporations with Respect to Human Rights.29 Specifically, it was noted by
several participants that corporate law should be considered when exploring the tools available
to states for “improving corporate behaviour.”30 As corporate judicial (legal) personality was
something that depended upon government approval (through the requirements enunciated in
corporate laws), “more thought should be given to how that privilege could be made conditional
on respect for human rights.”31 The ability of state (corporate) law to undermine innovative
market mechanisms supportive of human rights, such as shareholder and third party activism,
was also noted.32 Ultimately, participants suggested that legislators should design regulatory
tools addressing corporate policies, processes and culture, including “corporate law tools” so as
to more effectively prevent corporate abuse, rather than focusing solely on the “reactive nature of
adjudication”.33 Specifically identified were the importance of social reporting, fiduciary duties,
the prohibition of unfair commercial practices, and the potential role of legislation in helping to
pierce the corporate veil given that state judiciaries were often unwilling to take innovative steps
to address the challenges of transnational access to justice.34
As I have discussed elsewhere, corporate and securities laws are the product of the
legislative organs of states, and, as understood through the lens of the international law of state
responsibility, the state duty to protect human rights attaches equally to legislative organs as to
executive and judicial organs.35 Moreover, according to the documented conclusions of the
Special Representative’s survey of the human rights treaty bodies in 2007, states are understood
to be responsible under primary international human rights treaty and customary international
law for a failure to protect individuals against third party abuses where states fail to implement
systems of “due diligence” to prevent, investigate, punish and redress rights violations by

26

Ibid at 24 (para 112).
Ibid at 24 (footnote 12).
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Ibid at 24 (para 112).
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Ibid at 9 (paras 4-67). See further “The Role of States in Effectively Regulating and Adjudicating the Activities of
Corporations With Respect to Human Rights,” Summary report of meeting in Copenhagen (8-9 November 2007), online:
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/Ruggie-Copenhagen-8-9Nov-2007.pdf [Copenhagen Summary Report]. The author was fortunate to attend this consultation and spoke on the first
panel on the “Meaning, Sources and Scope of the Duty to Protect”.
30
Ibid, Consultations Addendum 2008 at 11 (para 18).
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid at 12-13 (para 24).
33
Ibid at 19 (para 59).
34
Ibid at 19 (para 59 & para 57).
35
See generally analysis in Sara L. Seck, “Conceptualizing the Home State Duty to Protect Human Rights” in Karin
Buhmann, Lynn Roseberry, & Mette Morsing, eds., Corporate Social and Human Rights Responsibilities: Global Legal and
Management Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 25.
27

5

corporate actors.36 However, as documented by the Special Representative in a survey of state
practice, even those states that recognize the duty to protect “lack policies, programs or tools
designed specifically to deal with corporate human rights challenges.”37 This, according to
Ruggie, is coupled with a “growing concern that states either do not fully understand or are not
always willing or able to fulfill the duty to protect.”38 Consequently, it is logical that consideration
of the state duty to protect human rights in the business context should include consideration of
the nature of corporate law itself among the potential tools for realizing the state duty to protect.
When Protect, Respect, Remedy was “unanimously welcomed” by member states of the UN Human
Rights Council in June 2008, signs were emerging that the role of corporate law was to be given
greater consideration.
Notably, under the state duty to protect, Protect, Respect, Remedy explicitly highlights the
importance of governments fostering “corporate cultures in which respecting rights is an integral
part of doing business”.39 In this context, there is reference to the role that governments can play
in supporting market pressures on companies by enabling stakeholders to compare corporate
conduct in relation to rights through mandated sustainability reporting, whether tied to stock
exchanges, states or subnational authorities.40 There is also mention of the redefinition of
fiduciary duties in the United Kingdom’s company law, where directors are now required “to
“have regard” to such matters as “the impact of the company’s operations on the community and
the environment”.41 Finally, the increased acceptance by regulators of shareholder proposals
relating to human rights issues for consideration at company annual general meetings was
recognized.42 With regard to the corporate responsibility to respect rights, the concept of “due
diligence” was explicitly adopted as a requirement to discharge the responsibility, and is
described in Protect, Respect, Remedy as “the steps a company must take to become aware of,
prevent and address adverse human rights impacts.”43 Moreover, according to Protect, Respect,
Remedy, the reason for choosing the due diligence formulation was because “comparable
processes are typically already embedded in companies” due to the fact that “in many countries
they are legally required to have information and control systems in place to assess and manage
financial and related risks.”44 While no specific reference to corporate law is found here, it is
clearly implicit in this statement. In terms of access to remedy as presented in Protect, Respect,
Remedy, a potential role for corporate law is less evident. However, the idea that an effective
36

See generally State Responsibilities Addendum, supra note 22. See also Consultations Addendum 2008 at 10-11 (paras
12 & 13); Copenhagen Summary Report, supra note 31 at 2.
37
See discussion of this issue in the “Background Note: The Role of States in Effectively Regulating and Adjudicating the
Activities of Corporations With Respect to Human Rights” prepared for the Copenhagen consultation in November 2007,
online: http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Copenhagen-8-9-Nov-2007-backgrounder.pdf?9a4b1168 at 1 [Copenhagen
Background Note]. See generally Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human
rights and transnational corporations and other multinational enterprises, Addendum: Human Rights Policies and
Management Practices: Results from Questionnaire Surveys of Governments and Fortune Global 500 Firms, UNHRC, 4th
Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/4/35/Add.3 (28 February 2007).
38
Copenhagen Background Note, ibid.
39
Protect, Respect, Remedy at 10 (para 29).
40
Ibid at 10 (para 30). Specifically noted are initiatives by Sweden and China in this area.
41
Ibid citing United Kingdom Companies Act (2006), s.172(1)(d).
42
Ibid citing “Trends in the use of corporate law and shareholder activism to increase corporate responsibility and
accountability for human rights” prepared for the Special Representative by the law firm Fried Frank, available at:
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/Fried-Frank-Memo-Dec-2007.pdf
43
Ibid at 17 (para 56).
44
Ibid
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company-level grievance mechanism is an essential component for discharging the responsibility
to respect is introduced,45 an idea that could in theory be mandated through corporate law.
Ruggie subsequently identified as significant the fact that Protect, Respect, Remedy had
been “endorsed or employed” by not only individual governments, but also “business enterprises
and associations, civil society and workers’ organizations” as well as “multilateral institutions”
such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and other UN special procedures. Indeed, the
Special Representative attributed the “widespread positive reception” of Protect, Respect, Remedy
to both its “utility” and “the large number and inclusive character of stakeholder consultations
convened by and for the mandate.”46 Accordingly, he adopted a similar process to provide
concrete and practical recommendations for the implementation of Protect, Respect, Remedy as
he prepared the Guiding Principles. As a result, “by January 2011 the mandate had held 47
international consultations, on all continents, and the Special Representative and his team had
made site visits to business operations and their local stakeholders in more than 20 countries.”47
Included in the consultations that followed were several relating specifically to corporate law.
The Corporate Law Project
The Process
The Corporate Law Project was launched in early 2009 and represented one of several
initiatives that informed the 2011 Guiding Principles. More than twenty leading corporate law
firms from around the world assisted on a pro bono basis to “identify whether and how corporate
and securities law in 39 jurisdictions currently encourages companies to respect human rights.”48
The jurisdictions chosen for this mapping project were selected to reflect the expertise of the
participating firms, as well as “to ensure a broad geographic spread and a mix of common law,
civil law, and other legal traditions.”49 Each firm was asked to prepare a jurisdiction-specific
survey based upon a research template that explored subjects such as: incorporation and listing,
director’s duties, reporting, and stakeholder engagement.50 The individual survey results of the
corporate law tools mapping project are available for scrutiny on the Special Representative’s
web portal on the Business and Human Rights website.51
While the Corporate Law Project might seem at first glance to be intimately connected
with the corporate responsibility to respect, the project was in fact designed to contribute to the
development of the Guiding Principles on the state duty to protect, by “providing information
regarding current state practice as well as facilitating discussion” of potential “policy
45

Ibid at 24 (para 93).
Guiding Principles, supra note 3 at para 8.
47
Ibid.
48
Corporate Law addendum, supra note 3 at para 11. The law firms were chosen based upon both their “expertise in
working with corporate clients” and their “experience in working with corporate clients on human rights-related issues.”
See further http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/Materialsbytopic/Corporatelaw
49
Corporate law addendum, supra note 3 at para 11.
50
Ibid. at para 15. The template and a list of participating firms are included as appendices to the Corporate law
addendum. The author was among a number of contributors to the design of the template.
51
See online: http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/CorporateLawTools . The Corporate Law
Project was developed and coordinated by Vanessa Zimmerman, a legal advisor to the Special Representative.
46
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recommendations to make to states in this area.”52 As a “key aspect” of the first pillar of Protect,
Respect, Remedy was that states “should help foster corporate cultures respectful of rights both at
home and abroad”, better understanding the role of corporate and securities law in “directly
shap[ing] what companies do and how they do it” was seen as crucial.53 The corporate law
project also supported the corporate responsibility to respect, as participants provided
“important guidance on the elements of human rights due diligence in keeping with responsible
corporate governance.”54 In terms of access to remedy, the corporate law project provided
insights into the role of “company disclosure as well as stakeholder engagement” in preventing
the “escalation of disputes.”55 It also stimulated debate in discussions of “obstacles to legal
accountability” for human rights-related abuse committed by transnational corporate
“subsidiaries and other business partners”, such as the “particular challenges posed by complex
corporate groups” as well as “the relationship between corporate and individual liability.”56
Three consultations were held to inform the Corporate law project, the first a project
meeting in New York hosted by the law firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges in June 2009, which was
attended by participating firms and designed to explore current state practice, implementation
and enforcement.57 In November, 2009, a multi-stakeholder expert consultation was convened in
Toronto, Canada by Osgoode Hall Law School, drawing over 80 participants from twenty
countries around the world to discuss policy and legal reform [Toronto Consultation].58 A third
consultation, hosted by the law firm Hogan Lovells, brought together external and in-house North
American corporate counsel in New York in April 2010 to discuss the “legal implications of
human rights due diligence,” including opportunities for “effective risk management as regulated
by corporate law.”59 All three of these consultations were held in North America, yet the
participants in the first two were representative of diverse global perspectives. Notably, the
Toronto Consultation included participants from China, Brazil, India, Hong Kong, Singapore,
South Africa, and Algeria, as well as Europe and North America.60 While participants in both New
York consultations were primarily corporate lawyers and corporate counsel, the Toronto
consultation was explicitly designed as a multi-stakeholder event with representatives from
government, human rights NGOs, industry associations, shareholder associations, academia,

52

Corporate law addendum, ibid. at para. 12.
Ibid. at paras 9-10.
54
Ibid. at para 13.
55
Ibid. at para 14.
56
Ibid. at para 14.
57
Ibid. at para 19. See Corporate Law Tools Project Meeting, New York, 30 June 2009, online: http://www.reports-andmaterials.org/Ruggie-corporate-law-tools-meeting-summary-30-Jun-2009.pdf [Weil Consultation]
58
Ibid. at para 19. See Corporate Law Tools Project Summary Report: Expert Meeting on Corporate Law and Human Rights:
Opportunities and Challenges of Using Corporate Law to Encourage Corporations to Respect Human Rights, Toronto, 5-6
November 2009, online: http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Corporate-law-tools-Toronto-meeting-report-5-6-Nov2009.pdf [Toronto Consultation] (This consultation was co-convened by the author and Professor Aaron Dhir of Osgoode
Hall Law School).
59
Ibid. at para 19. See Export Meeting of North American Corporate and External Counsel: Exploring Human Rights Due
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than 20 countries with expertise in over 40 jurisdictions.” Guiding Principles, ibid at para 11.
60
Toronto Consultation, supra note 60 at Appendix 1: Attendees.
53
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business and corporate lawyer firms.61 Overall, corporate lawyers appear to have been more
heavily engaged in the corporate law project than other aspects of the mandate, and human
rights NGOs appear to have been less engaged.62 The corporate law project also had
comparatively greater North American influence than other aspects of the mandate, although the
firms participating in the mapping project represented diverse regions of the world as did the
jurisdictions surveyed.63
The overarching conclusions of the corporate law study were attached in an addendum to
the Guiding Principles entitled Human rights and corporate law: trends and observations from a
cross-national study conducted by the Special Representative [Cross-national Trends Study].64 This
overarching trends study draws upon the answers provided in each of the individual survey
reports. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to delve into any of the individual survey reports or
even to outline the overarching conclusions in great detail. The following sections will outline
some of the key findings.
Conclusions of the Cross-National Study: Legal Landscape, Incorporation & Listing
The first set of questions were designed to set the legal landscape for each jurisdiction by
exploring the legal tradition and federalism considerations, the structure and powers of
corporate and securities regulators within the jurisdiction, and other contextual issues.65 Here it
was explicitly noted that the “existence, or absence, of other domestic legal obligations on the
corporation to respect human rights” might strengthen or weaken the significance of certain
corporate law provisions.66 Yet also noted as an identifiable pattern among the jurisdictions
surveyed was the frequent lack of “interrelationship between corporate and securities law, and
more specific human rights-related laws and policies”.67 This, according to the Special
Representative, was consistent with the “horizontal” incoherence identified more broadly with
regard to state practice, where “economic or business-focused departments and agencies that
directly shape business practices conduct their work in isolation from and largely uninformed by
their government’s human rights agencies and obligations, and vice versa.”68
The second set of questions focused on incorporation and listing requirements.69
Questions considered here included whether concepts such as “limited liability” or “separate
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legal personality” existed in the jurisdiction; whether incorporation or listing historically
required recognition of a duty to society, including respect for human rights; and whether stock
exchanges had a responsible investment index and if so whether participation was voluntary.70
The study concluded that all jurisdictions represented “have a governing statue that describes: (i)
the types of permissible business forms; (ii) the creation and operation of each form; and (iii) the
type of liability that applies to each form.”71 Some form of “separate legal personality” or “limited
liability” existed in each jurisdiction, and most had a body of common law or statutory provisions
providing limited exceptions whereby company owners could be held directly liable for company
liabilities in situations involving “fraud, intentional avoidance of statutory or contractual
obligations, or some other act of bad faith.”72 However, courts in most jurisdictions were said to
be extremely reluctant to pierce the corporate veil73 and courts and regulators had provided
limited guidance as to how these exceptions might apply in the context of human rights
violations.74 Among notable findings was that under Brazilian law, shareholders may be held
liable regardless of fault for environmental damage where company assets are insufficient.75
With regard to a duty to society, the study found that it was uncommon for a state to
expressly require recognition of such a duty by companies, whether under corporate law or as a
listing requirement on a securities exchange.76 However, some jurisdictions require that
companies establish they are operating for a “lawful purpose”, or that they respect the “public
order”, while in others legislators provide a regulatory vehicle for companies to choose to
express a commitment to human rights in their constitutive documents.77 Notable here was a
provision in Chinese Company Law that requires corporations to “observe social morals and
commercial ethics, act with integrity and good faith, accept the supervision of the government
and the public, and undertake social liability.”78 By comparison, in the state of Oregon in the
United States, legislation expressly permits (but does not require) a company’s articles of
incorporation to “authoriz[e] or direct[] the corporation to conduct the business of the
corporation in a manner that is environmentally and socially responsible.”79 Similarly, while
stock exchange listing requirements rarely included “respect for human rights as a stand-alone
criterion”, social issues more broadly are at times evident.80 For example, companies listed on the
Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges in China are required to “commit to environmental
protection and community development whilst pursuing economic goals and protecting
shareholders’ interests”81 and listing rules in Malaysia include CSR reporting and guidance.82
Finally, the survey concluded that the stock exchanges of most surveyed jurisdictions did not
operate socially responsible investment (SRI) indices, and where they did, human rights were not
specifically included.83 Countries noted in the report as having SRI indices of interest included
70
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South Africa, Indonesia, Brazil, and the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and
Sweden).84
Conclusions of the Cross-National Study: Directors’ Duties
The third and most involved set of questions focused on directors’ duties, with the
intention of identifying when directors were “required, allowed, or encouraged” to consider
human rights when exercising oversight, and the scope of their discretion.85 Questions
considered here included to whom directors’ duties are generally owed (and whether they could
be owed to non-shareholders); whether there were explicit duties to avoid legal risk and
company reputational damage; and whether directors were required or permitted to consider
human rights impacts on individuals and communities affected by company operations, including
where such impacts were felt outside the jurisdiction, and where subsidiaries, suppliers or other
business partners caused the impacts.86 Further questions addressed the extent of discretion
directors had when considering impacts on non-shareholders; the legal consequences, if any, for
failing to fulfill duties as directors, and in particular who might initiate action.87
The scope of directors’ duties were found across jurisdictions to be set out in corporate
law statutes, “complemented by case law and regulatory guidance”88 including soft law corporate
governance codes.89 Three approaches were identified: a “shareholder approach” aimed at
maximizing shareholder value; a “stakeholder approach” aimed at taking into account a range of
stakeholders beyond shareholders in corporate decision-making; and the hybrid “enlightened
shareholder value approach” aimed at giving consideration to other stakeholders while at the
same time maximizing shareholder value.90 While the scope of directors’ duties clearly varied
across jurisdictions, the study identified one “clear trend: directors are generally required to act
in the company’s best interests, which commonly means acting for the shareholders as a
whole.”91 This typically incorporated elements of “due care, loyalty and due diligence, and good
faith” although several jurisdictions also imposed a duty of secrecy.92 The study highlighted that
in the U.S. report, this duty “includes oversight of risk management and compliance, which would
necessitate periodic review by the board of corporate processes designed to prevent and detect
violation of law or undue risk taking including human rights duties.”93 The study noted
jurisdictions that had adopted the enlightened shareholder value approach and the stakeholder
approach, one jurisdiction that had deliberately avoided enlightened shareholder value (Hong
Kong), and other jurisdictions that set out separate duties to shareholders in special
circumstances.94 Duties to third parties were generally found to arise under tort law rather than
directors’ duties under corporate law.95 The study further found that while none of the surveys
84
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identified a “separate, self-standing duty to avoid legal risk and damage to the company’s
reputation”, many argued this could be implied under existing directors’ duties.96 Despite this,
due to difficulties in proving harm and the wide scope of directors’ discretion, the “possibility of
holding directors accountable for failing to avoid legal risk and reputational damage” might be
limited.97 However, according to some surveys, a “duty to avoid legal risk and reputational
damage could form part of a director’s duty to oversee risk management” as part of the director’s
general duty to act in the company’s best interests.98
In terms of impacts on non-shareholders, the study confirmed that in nearly all
jurisdictions surveyed corporate law “does not explicitly require directors to consider the
company’s impacts on non-shareholders, including human rights impacts,” and even where such
a requirement does exist, it is framed within the duty to act in the company’s best interest.99
However, many surveys suggested consideration of non-shareholder human rights impacts was
implicitly in the best interests of the company, while others suggested that even if neither explicit
nor implicit, these considerations were permitted if not encouraged as long as they accorded
with the best interests of the company.100 Among jurisdictions identified in the study were the UK
Companies Act’s requirement that directors have regard to the impact of the company’s
operations on the community and environment, and Brazilian Corporations Law which mandates
that the director “shall use the powers conferred to him by law and by the bylaws to achieve the
company’s corporate purposes and to support its best interests, satisfying the requirements of
the public at large and the social role of the company.”101 Also of note were the constituency
statutes found in 30 U.S. states that explicitly permit directors to consider effects of board actions
on other designated constituencies.102
With regard to jurisdictional scope, the surveys generally found that where impacts on
non-shareholders must or may be considered, corporate law was silent with regard to the
location of the impacts – so the general assumption was that consideration was the same
regardless of location.103 However, the surveys also suggested that legal compliance might
depend on whether the law was considered to have extraterritorial application, which might
depend on whether the issue involved an international crime (extraterritorial application) or
local environmental planning (no extraterritorial application).104 While an express requirement
to consider human rights impacts of subsidiaries, suppliers and other business partners was only
found in a limited number of jurisdictions surveyed, the surveys suggested that if a company
could face risks in relation to these impacts due to violations of an applicable law, directors are
required to consider these impacts whether inside or outside the jurisdiction.105 In any case,
consideration of such impacts was considered to be permissible provided it accorded with the
best interests of the company.106 In terms of discretion, the surveys found as an overwhelming
96

Ibid at 16 (para 62).
Ibid at 17 (para 64).
98
Ibid at 17 (para 65).
99
Ibid at 18 (para 67).
100
Ibid at 18 (paras 68-69).
101
Ibid at 18-19 (paras 70, 72).
102
Ibid at 20 (para 77).
103
Ibid at 20 (paras 79-80).
104
Ibid at 20-21 (para 82).
105
Ibid at 21 (paras 84-85).
106
Ibid at 21 (para 86).
97

12

trend that whether or not directors are required or permitted to consider impacts on nonshareholders, “they are usually given broad discretion in their decision-making.”107 However,
discretion may be narrower where “linked to a particular legal provision” such as a requirement
in Kenyan environmental law that directors report on the impacts of certain projects on nonshareholders.108
The study also attempted to determine the legal consequences for failing to fulfill
directors’ duties, and importantly who might take action to initiate legal proceedings. The
surveys concluded that directors may be subject to civil claims by the company or shareholders
bringing the claim on the company’s behalf, and in some circumstances may be subject to
criminal or administrative penalties.109 While it was most usual for the company to take action,
other actors may be entitled to bring a claim in some circumstances, but generally speaking third
parties such as employees or members of affected communities would only be able to bring an
action against a director in tort, contract or criminal law, rather than through corporate law.110
The study highlights that even under the new South African Companies Act, which “allows any
person to launch a derivative action for breach of directors’ duties even if they are not a
shareholder provided they have the court’s leave to do so”, this would remain a derivative claim
seeking relief on behalf of the company with any relief granted being in favour of the company.111
Conclusions of the Cross-National Study: Reporting
The fourth set of questions addressed reporting of human rights impacts, including
whether companies were permitted or required to disclose human rights impacts on nonshareholders as part of or separate from financial reporting; whether this reporting extended to
impacts outside the jurisdiction and the impacts of subsidiaries, suppliers or other business
partners; and whether this reporting was accessible and verifiable, and what legal consequences
might flow from failures or misrepresentations.112
The discussion of reporting emphasized the importance placed by the Special
Representative on companies “communicating their human rights impacts (and how they are
addressing them)” as part of the corporate responsibility to respect rights.113 Importantly,
reporting is seen to provide “a measure of transparency and accountability to individuals or
groups who may be impacted by the company’s activities,” among other relevant stakeholders,
and may include consultation with affected stakeholders as well as formal public reports.114
While only a few jurisdictions expressly mandate “disclosure of social or environmental actions
or impacts on non-shareholders” either as part of a company’s annual report or as a stand-alone
report, some jurisdictions have adopted a “comply or explain” model that requires companies to
either disclose or explain why they have chosen not to.115 Of the jurisdictions that do mandate
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disclosure, one example of note is Indonesia’s New Company Law, which “requires all limited
liability companies to include a section in their annual reports regarding the realization of social
and environmental responsibility.”116 The study also notes that some African countries require
companies that perform activities that may affect the environment to submit environmental
impact assessment reports as part of licensing requirements.117 Even in jurisdictions that do not
mandate reporting, regulators and stock exchanges often encourage voluntary CSR reporting.118
The study also observed that the reporting of material risks as part of the disclosure of
financial information is required in the majority of jurisdictions.119 “Material” was defined in
many surveys as a fact that would be considered important by a reasonable shareholder in
deciding how to vote, or viewed by a reasonable investor as significantly altering the “total mix”
of available information.120 As a result, many surveys concluded that current reporting laws
require disclosure of human rights impacts to the extent that they may “significantly affect a
company’s stock price or pose a risk to the company.”121 However, a lack of guidance from courts
and regulators as to the materiality of human rights impacts was noted, along with concern that
reporting of these impacts might be constrained in some jurisdictions if it could be viewed as
harmful to the company.122
In terms of the jurisdictional scope of reporting, the surveys provided only a few examples
of express requirements to consider company impacts abroad, including by foreign subsidiaries
and business partners.123 Notably, the study observed that “it is also rare to see an express
territorial restriction attached to a reporting requirement,” whether financial or separate CSR
reports.124 Indeed “to the extent that foreign actions relating to human rights pose a material risk
or could significantly affect a company’s share value, such actions should be reported in the same
way that they would be reported if they occurred inside the incorporating jurisdiction.”125
However, it was rare for group reporting requirements to extend beyond subsidiaries to “the
impacts of suppliers or other business partners”, although voluntary reporting guidelines often
encourage “awareness of activities in all aspects of the value chain”.126
The study concluded that in most jurisdictions company annual reports and financial
statements are verified by an “independent certified auditor” which were then subject to the
review of a regulatory authority for listed companies.127 However, even for mandatory CSR
reporting regimes, these verification requirements tended not to apply, with the exception of
some African countries, including South Africa where “a company’s audit committee must verify
its integrated sustainability report.”128 Similarly, while annual reports and financial statements
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must be made accessible to the public in most jurisdictions surveyed, “it is rare for a state to
require that CSR reports be made publicly accessible,” although companies are increasingly doing
so on a voluntary basis.129 In terms of accountability, individuals, including directors, may incur
administrative penalties, civil or even criminal liability along with the company for (intentional)
material false statements or omissions or failure to fulfill reporting obligations, while companies
may be delisted from stock exchanges.130 These consequences would apply where reporting on
material human rights impacts is required as part of financial reporting, while tort law or
misleading or deceptive marketing legislation may apply in the context of even voluntary CSR
reports.131
Conclusions of the Cross-National Study: Stakeholder Engagement
The fifth set of questions canvassed stakeholder engagement, in particular the degree to
which groups such as shareholders, institutional investors and “other interested parties” have
capacity to influence corporate decision-making in relation to human rights.132 Questions here
included whether there were restrictions on the circulating of shareholder proposals raising
human rights impacts on non-shareholders; whether institutional investors were required or
permitted to consider such impacts in their investment decisions; and whether non-shareholders
could address annual general meetings of companies.133
An important finding was that while in some jurisdictions a corporation is required to
circulate a shareholder proposal as part of a package of management information provided in
anticipation of the company’s annual general meeting, this mechanism is not commonly used in
emerging economies.134 Where the mechanism exists, impediments to the circulation of
shareholder proposals dealing with human rights issues were found to be mainly procedural
relating to who and how proposals are circulated, and applicable broadly to all types of
shareholder proposals.135 Specifically, a certain percentage of capital equity ownership is
generally required in order to put forward a proposal.136 Substantive restrictions tended to be
generally worded, prohibiting “defamatory proposals” or proposals that were not seen as
“relevant” to company business, rather than expressly precluding proposals dealing with human
rights or environmental issues.137 Surveys suggested that there was less willingness by courts
and regulators to allow companies to block proposals relating to social issues, and that there had
been an increase in human rights-related proposals in recent years.138 In jurisdictions without
the shareholder proposal mechanism like India, alternate mechanisms such as a system of
extraordinary meetings whereby a prescribed minimum of shareholders request that the
directors call a meeting may be used.139 However, most surveys noted that non-shareholders “do
not, as of right, have the ability to address a company’s AGM, though it is possible that such rights
129
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may be included in a company’s governing documents.”140 Moreover, for non-shareholders to
even attend a company’s AGM is contingent in most jurisdictions on a “proxy designation on the
part of an actual shareholder or a special invitation from the company’s management”.141 With
regard to institutional investors, the surveys concluded that in most cases the “trustees of
institutional investors are permitted, though not generally required, to make decisions based on
human rights considerations, provided these decisions remain in the fund’s best interests.”142
However, as many different entities with widely differing legal characteristics and mandates fall
within the overarching term “institutional investors”, including pension funds, nuances are to be
found in the legislative approaches of different jurisdictions in different contexts.143
Conclusions of the Cross-National Study: Other Issues of Corporate Governance
Finally, the last set of questions addressed other issues of corporate governance, including
whether other laws, policies, codes or guidelines relating to corporate governance might
encourage corporate cultures respectful of human rights; whether laws imposed any
constituency representation on boards of directors such as of employees or affected
communities; and whether laws required diversity representation on boards of directors.144
The study concluded that many jurisdictions have national CSR policies or institutes,
although fewer deal specifically with human rights,145 and that even “voluntary corporate
governance guidelines, whether state or business-led, may play a significant role in encouraging
companies to act in a more socially responsible manner.”146 Specifically noted here were the
various King reports in South African and accompanying corporate governance codes, as well as
the “social responsibility compliance guides” issued by the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock
Exchanges, designed to “encourage listed companies to protect the interests of stakeholders, fulfil
their social responsibility and promote the sustainable development of society and the
environment whilst pursuing economic aims.”147 An emerging trend of “business association
codes touching on CSR” was also identified, including for example the corporate governance
guidelines for SMEs issued by the Hong Kong Institute of Directors.148
In terms of constituency representation on boards of directors, the surveys indicated that
it is rare for corporate laws to require non-shareholders to be represented on company boards,
with employee board representation the occasional exception.149 While other constituencies such
as creditors or government representatives might in rare cases be granted representation on a
corporate board, there were no survey examples of “any requirements to include on company
boards representatives from communities affected by the company’s operations.”150 In terms of
gender or racial/ethnic representation on company boards, the surveys concluded that there are
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a small number of jurisdictions that do require diversity representation on boards, and an
increasing number of voluntary codes appear to be addressing this issue.151
Conclusions
The conclusions of this cross-national study of corporate law in the business and human
rights context highlight the importance of “laws and policies that govern the creation and
ongoing operation of business enterprises, such as corporate and securities laws” in “directly
shap[ing] business behaviour.”152 Yet while “particularly well placed to contribute to the “smart
mix”” required to address human rights problems, the implications of these laws for human
rights “remain poorly understood”.153 The surveys identify a lack of clarity with regard to human
rights considerations in many contexts, suggesting that states could respond with greater
guidance for companies and stakeholders, whether through “explanatory notes and awarenessraising programs through soft law guidelines to prescriptive regulation.”154 The next section will
explore the extent to which the findings of the Corporate Law Project are reflected within the
Guiding Principles themselves.
Relationship between Corporate Law Project and the Guiding Principles
The Guiding Principles were “subject to extensive consultations”, first in October 2010 through
day-long sessions held separately with Human Rights Council delegates, business enterprises and
associations, and civil society groups, discussing an annotated outline of the proposals.155 Then, in
November 2010, a full draft of the Guiding Principles and related commentary was “sent to all
Member States”, and simultaneously “posted online for public comment” until the end of January
2011.156 According to the Special Representative, the online consultation “attracted 3,576 unique
visitors from 120 countries and territories”, and “[s]ome 100 written submissions were sent directly to
the Special Representative, including by Governments.”157 The Draft Guiding Principles were also
“discussed at an expert multi-stakeholder meeting, and then at a session with Council delegations, both
held in January 2011.”158 Thus “[t]he final text … is the product of this extensive and inclusive
process.”159
The question for the purpose of this chapter is to what extent the corporate law project in
fact influenced the final substantive content of the Guiding Principles. While the detailed Crossnational Trends Study did become an addendum to the Guiding Principles and in places clearly
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identifies the need for further research, this part will document the extent to which the Guiding
Principles in fact reflect findings in the Cross-national Trends Study.
The starting point for this analysis is the state duty to protect. As discussed briefly above,
the corporate law project can be conceptualized as integrally linked to the idea that corporations
are the product of state legislative organs, which facilitate the creation of business associations
by way of corporate law statutes.160 This basic understanding of the state duty to protect human
rights is implicit in foundational Principle 1 of the Guiding Principles, which provides:
“States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction
by third parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to
prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation,
regulations and adjudication.”
While on the surface this statement appears clearly aimed at state policies, legislation and
regulation that are applied to pre-existing corporate actors, a glance at the operational principles
under the state duty to protect makes it clear that the state duty is not so limited. Specifically,
Principle 3 indicates clearly that to meet their duty to protect, States should not only enforce laws
that requires business enterprises to respect human rights, and periodically assess their
adequacy,161 but also “States should:
(b) Ensure that other laws and policies governing the creation and ongoing operation of
business enterprises, such as corporate law, do not constrain but enable business respect
for human rights;
(c) Provide effective guidance to business enterprises on how to respect human rights
throughout their operations;
(d) Encourage, and where appropriate require, business enterprises to communicate how
they address their human rights impacts.”162
The Commentary to Principle 3 reiterates the importance of corporate and securities law
and policy which “govern the creation and ongoing operation of business enterprises” in directly
shaping business behaviour, yet remain “poorly understood” in terms of their implications for
human rights.163 The “lack of clarity” identified in the corporate law project with regard to what
“companies and their officers are permitted, let alone required, to do regarding human rights” is
also restated here, along with the need for law and policies to “provide sufficient guidance to
enable enterprises to respect human rights, with due regard to the role of existing governance
structures such as corporate boards.”164 This guidance should “indicate the expected outcomes
and help share best practices”, while also advising on “appropriate methods, including human
rights due diligence” as well as “how to consider effectively issues of gender, vulnerability and/or
marginalization.”165 However, the Commentary does not make reference to any specific “model”
legislation, nor does Principle 3 frame the need for states to ensure that corporate laws “not
constrain but enable respect for human rights” in mandatory language.
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The Commentary to Principle 3 also highlights the importance of business enterprises
communicating how they address human rights impacts, ranging from “informal engagement
with affected stakeholders to formal public reporting”, and identifies “State encouragement, or
where appropriate requirements for, such communication” as important to “foster respect for
human rights by business enterprises.166 Rather than recommending that states should mandate
CSR reporting, however, the Commentary suggests states could provide “incentives” to
communicate adequate information by “giv[ing] weight to self-reporting in the event of any
judicial or administrative proceeding”, with a “requirement” to communicate being “particularly
appropriate where the nature of business operations or operating contexts pose a significant risk
to human rights”.167 To ensure “accessibility and accuracy” of the information communicated,
state policies and laws could “usefully clarify what and how businesses should communicate”,
taking into account “risks” posed to the “safety and security of individuals and facilities” as well
as commercial confidentiality and “variations in companies’ size and structures.”168 With regard
to financial reporting requirements, the Commentary to Principle 3 suggests that these should
“clarify that human rights impacts in some instances may be “material” or “significant” to the
economic performance of the business enterprise.”169
While Principle 3 does not address the jurisdictional scope of reporting or other corporate
and securities law issues, foundational Principle 2 of the Guiding Principles does offer some
insights. As noted above in the Cross-national Trends Study, the question of whether reporting
and other corporate and securities law-related obligations might extend to the impacts of
subsidiaries, suppliers and other business partners was on the agenda as part of the corporate
law project.170 Draft Principle 2 of the Guiding Principles was subject to much debate during the
public consultation period ending in January 2011, with particular controversy attaching to the
question of whether this Principle should explicitly assert that the state duty to protect extends
extraterritorially.171 In the final version, the word “extraterritorial” appears only twice within the
commentaries, and the final text of Principle 2 reads:
“States should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in
their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations.”172
The Commentary to Principle 2 reiterates the Special Representative’s position that
international human rights law does not require states to “regulate the extraterritorial activities
of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction” but neither are they “generally
prohibited from doing so, provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis.”173 Moreover, “some
human rights treaty bodies recommend that home States take steps to prevent abuse abroad by
business enterprises within their jurisdiction.”174 While noting that states may adopt a “range of
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approaches”, the Commentary specifically identifies “requirements on “parent” companies to
report on the global operations of the entire enterprise” as an example of “domestic measures
with extraterritorial implications”, to be distinguished from “direct extraterritorial legislation
and enforcement”.175
The remaining Principles under the state duty to protect do not reference corporate and
securities law, aside from Principle 8’s discussion of policy coherence. Principle 8 reads:
“States should ensure that governmental departments, agencies and other State-based
institutions that shape business practices are aware of and observe the State’s human
rights obligations when fulfilling their respective mandates, including by providing them
with relevant information, training and support.”176
The Commentary specifically identifies the need for states to equip and support departments and
agencies that “shape business practices – including those responsible for corporate law and
securities regulation” among others, so that they may “be informed of and act in a manner
compatible with the Government’s human rights obligations.”177 This would ensure “[h]orizontal
policy coherence.”178
It is clear then, from this brief examination of the state duty to protect in the Guiding
Principles that the corporate law tools project was not disregarded in the substantive
recommendations. However, neither is the state duty to protect clearly framed as mandating
states to ensure corporate and securities laws facilitate corporate respect for human rights, nor
are any specific substantive recommendations made as to how this could be achieved. While the
encouraging rather than mandating tone of the recommendations is in keeping with the approach
taken throughout the Guiding Principles, it is no less remarkable.
The corporate law tools project was also designed to inform the corporate responsibility
to respect rights, and in particular to provide “important guidance on the elements of human
rights due diligence in keeping with responsible corporate governance.”179 As described in the
Cross-national Trends Study, while a human rights due diligence process “can be incorporated
within broader enterprise risk-management systems” it must go “beyond simply identifying and
managing material risks to the company itself” in order to meet the responsibility to respect, and
must also “include risks to rights-holders.”180 Interestingly, as evident from the conclusions of the
corporate law project outlined above, directors’ duties under corporate law are usually
conceptualized as duties owed to the company itself, providing uncertain space for explicit
consideration of impacts on non-shareholders, with a lack of clarity surrounding even the
permissibility of such considerations. This is coupled with the inability of human rights impacted
non-shareholders to either seek remedy or even draw attention to their claims through existing
corporate law tools. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the discussion of the corporate
responsibility to respect in the Guiding Principles makes little if any reference to corporate law
tools. Instead, the corporate responsibility to respect rights is presented in foundational principle
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11 as: “Business enterprises should respect human rights. This means that they should avoid
infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with
which they are involved.”181 The Commentary clearly notes that this responsibility is a:
“global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they operate”
that “exists independently of States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human
rights obligations, and does not diminish those obligations. And it exists over and above
compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human rights.”182
To meet the corporate responsibility to respect, businesses must take “adequate measures” to
prevent, mitigate and “where appropriate,” remediate adverse human rights impacts.183
Importantly, “[b]usiness enterprises should not undermine States’ abilities to meet their own
human rights obligations, including by actions that might weaken the integrity of judicial
processes.”184
Jurisdictional scope was also an issue that lacked clarity under the corporate law tools
project, so it is again not surprising that the corporate responsibility to respect avoids reference
to corporate law, instead stating in Principle 13:
“The responsibility to respect human rights requires that business enterprises:
(a) Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human right impacts through their
own activities, and address such impacts where they occur;
(b) Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly
linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if
they have not contributed to those impacts.”185
According to the Commentary to Principle 13, “business relationships” are “understood to
include relationships with business partners, entities in its value chain, and any other non-State
or State entity directly linked to its business operations, products or services.”186
In Principle 15, the Guiding Principles also articulate the “policies and processes” that
business enterprises should have in place (as “appropriate to their size and circumstances”) in
order to meet their responsibility to respect,187 but again these are not in any way linked to
requirements under corporate law. Listed are:
“(a) A policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights;
(b) A human rights due-diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for
how they address their impacts on human rights;
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(c) Processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they cause
or to which they contribute.”188
The operational principles under the corporate responsibility to respect expand upon these
requirements, again with little if any reference to their grounding in corporate law. Of note under
Principle 17, the Commentary states clearly that human rights due diligence “can be included
within broader enterprise risk-management systems, provided that it goes beyond simply
identifying and managing material risks to the company itself, to include risks to rightsholders.”189 This echoes the disconnect noted earlier between directors’ duties and human rights
due diligence. Also striking is the clear distinction in the Commentary to Principle 17 between the
conduct of human rights due diligence and legal liability, signaling another disconnect. According
to the Commentary, while “[c]onducting appropriate human rights due diligence should help
business enterprises address the risk of legal claims against them by showing that they took
every reasonable step to avoid involvement with an alleged human rights abuse,” “business
enterprising conducting such due diligence should not assume that, by itself, this will
automatically and fully absolve them from liability for causing or contributing to human rights
abuses.”190 The corporate responsibility to respect also includes a discussion of communication
of human rights impacts to affected stakeholders in Principle 21.191 The Commentary is arguably
somewhat rooted in legal requirements under corporate and securities laws, with reference to
the evolution of formal reporting, from “traditional annual reports and corporate
responsibility/sustainability reports, to include on-line updates and integrated financial and nonfinancial reports.”192
Access to remedy is the third pillar of Protect, Respect, Remedy and the Guiding Principles.
Foundational Principle 25 clearly roots access to remedy in the state duty to protect, stating that
as part of their duty to protect, “States must take appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial,
administrative, legislative or other appropriate measures, that when such abuses occur within
their territory and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to effective remedy.”193 As noted
earlier, the corporate law tools project was ostensibly designed to inform the obstacles that arise
to legal remedy, and especially the “particular challenges posed by complex corporate groups” as
well as “the relationship between corporate and individual liability”.194 However, there is
essentially no reference at all whether explicit or implicit to the findings of the corporate law
project within access to remedy. Remedy is defined broadly to include “apologies, restitution,
rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation and punitive sanctions (whether criminal
or administrative, such as fines), as well as the prevention of harm through, for example,
injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition.”195 Access to remedy is to be provided by “grievance
mechanisms” which are defined as “any routinized, State-based or non-State-based, judicial or
non-judicial process through which grievances concerning business-related human rights abuse
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can be raised and remedy can be sought.”196 Within this wide system of remedy, “operationallevel grievance mechanisms can provide early-stage recourse and resolution.”197
In terms of legal remedy, Principle 26 discusses the need to operationalize state-based
judicial mechanisms by reducing “legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a
denial of access to remedy”.198 There is very brief reference here to the legal barriers that arise
where “legal responsibility is attributed among members of a corporate group under domestic
criminal or civil laws” so as to “faciliate[] the avoidance of appropriate accountability”.199
However, ultimately no concrete recommendations follow on how state legislatures or courts
could address this problem.
State-based non-judicial mechanisms along with non-state-based grievance mechanisms
are discussed in Principles 27 and 28, both emphasizing that traditional state-based legal remedy
is only one small part of a comprehensive approach to remedy.200 Principle 29 elaborates upon
the idea of operational grievance mechanisms for “individuals and communities who may be
adversely impacted.”201 The Principle suggests that business enterprises should establish or
participate in such mechanisms in order to identify adverse human rights impacts as part of
ongoing human rights due diligence, and also to make it possible to address grievances, once
identified, early on and directly, thereby preventing the escalation of grievances.202 While in
theory this type of grievance mechanism could easily be linked to implementation through
corporate law, there is no mention here or elsewhere of this idea. The rationale for keeping this
type of mechanisms separate from corporate law implementation becomes apparent in the
discussion of effectiveness criteria for non-judicial mechanisms elaborated under Principle 31(h),
which suggests that operational-level mechanisms should be “[b]ased upon engagement and
dialogue: consulting the stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended on their design and
performance, and focusing on dialogue as the means to address and resolve grievances.”203 While
an internalized version of a derivative action, for example, could in theory form the basis for an
operational-level grievance mechanism structure, this would be unfeasible given the need to
engage stakeholder groups in the design of the grievance mechanism as further discussed in the
Commentary:
“For an operational-level grievance mechanism, engaging with affected stakeholder
groups about its design and performance can help to ensure that it meets their needs, that
they will use it in practice, and that there is a shared interest in ensuring its success. Since
a business enterprise cannot, with legitimacy, both be the subject of complaints and
unilaterally determine their outcome, these mechanisms should focus on reaching agreed
solutions through dialogue. Where adjudication is needed, this should be provided by a
legitimate, independent third-party mechanism.”204
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Conclusions: Implications and a Research Agenda
Overall, then, it appears that little of the corporate law tools project made its way
explicitly into the Guiding Principles, at least in the way of concrete recommendations for the
operationalization of Protect, Respect, Remedy. On one level this is somewhat surprising,
particularly if one is familiar with both the 2009 and 2010 yearly Reports that the Special
Representative submitted to UN Human Rights Council. For example, under the discussion of the
state duty to protect in the 2009 UN Report, there is a section explicitly entitled “Corporate law”
which identifies several innovative legislative developments described by Ruggie as evidence of a
trend toward both governments and courts “introduc[ing] more public interest considerations
into the equation.”205 In a section on due diligence under the corporate responsibility to respect,
there is explicit discussion of the link between human rights due diligence and liability for
firms.206 Here, the Special Representative suggests that “done properly, human rights due
diligence should precisely create opportunities to mitigate risks and engage meaningfully with
stakeholders so that disingenuous lawsuits will find little support beyond the individuals who file
them.” He then concludes that the ongoing work of the mandate, “including the corporate law
project, should shed further light on this question, and on what policy changes by States could
ensure that companies are incentivized to undertake human rights due diligence.”207 Similarly,
the 2010 UN Report included a section entitled “Fostering rights-respecting corporate culture”
under the state duty to protect which speaks explicitly about four “policy tools”: “CSR policies,
reporting requirements, directors’ duties and legal provisions specifically recognizing the
concept of “corporate culture”.208 The relationship between the corporate responsibility to
respect and legal compliance is also discussed extensively in the 2010 UN Report, which
proposes three “compliance-related scenarios” where “prudence suggests companies should
adopt a legal compliance approach even though precise legal standards may not yet be fully
defined.”209 The second of these, “the possible “materiality” of human rights-related risks”, is
explicitly linked to compliance with existing securities and corporate governance regulations.210
So why, then, do the Guiding Principles tread so delicately when it comes to making
specific recommendations for states to implement “corporate law tools” that could at least
contribute to the satisfaction of the state duty to protect and the facilitation of compliance with
the corporate responsibility to respect? There are likely several reasons for this. First, perhaps,
there is the nature of the corporate law tools project itself. While commendable in its scope, there
are clearly a number of limitations inherent in a study that relies upon the interpretation of
existing laws as provided through surveys completed by corporate law firms, without subjecting
these surveys to critique. This limitation is acknowledged in the Cross-national Trends Study,
which explicitly notes that it does not attempt to critique the interpretation of existing laws
provided by the law firms, nor were any external sources consulted that might differ from the
205
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views presented by the firm surveys. Moreover, references to laws in the survey report should
not be seen as endorsements of best practice, nor even as reflecting the views of the firms, but
rather as the Special Representative’s interpretation.211 That there may be different
interpretations and different possibilities within corporate law is evident from scholarly
literature relating to “progressive corporate law”212 or “sustainable companies”,213 as well as
competing interpretations of doctrines such as the concept of multinational enterprise liability
found in Indian courts.214 Clearly the conclusions of the Cross-National Trends Study are not the
final word, although many may indeed reflect the influence of traditional economic theory on
corporate law and practice.
Secondly, there is the tentative and uncertain nature of many of the conclusions reached
in the Cross-National Trends Study. The corporate responsibility to respect rights is in many ways
more far reaching than the scope of corporate liability legally mandated through existing
company and securities laws, supplemented by laws of general application. While not “legally
binding”, the corporate responsibility to respect is conceptualized as reaching beyond the limits
of legal liability encased in doctrines of limited liability and separate legal personality, extending
tentatively instead into the reaches of impacts directly linked to company operations, products or
services by a business relationship. This type of jurisdictional reach would be challenging if
articulated through state-centric law, as evident in the controversy surrounding the language of
“extraterritoriality” in relation to Principle 2 of the Guiding Principles. When complemented by
mechanisms of non-judicial remedy under the access to remedy pillar with similar reach, it may
be that the “non-legally binding” nature of the corporate responsibility to respect is somewhat
less troubling.215
This is particularly so if both the polycentric governance character216 and normative
content of the Guiding Principles operationalizing Protect, Respect Remedy Framework are
recognized. According to Ruggie, the normative contribution of this polycentric governance
framework “lies not in the creation of new international law obligations but in elaborating the
implications of existing standards and practices for States and businesses; integrating them
within a single, logically coherent and comprehensive template; and identifying where the
current regime falls short and how it should be improved”.217 Indeed “nothing in these Guiding
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Principles should be read as creating new international law obligations or as limiting or
undermining any legal obligations a State may have undertaken or be subject to under
international law with regard to human rights.”218 Viewed in this light, the aim of the outcomes of
the corporate law tools project would be to point toward a general direction for future state
practice aimed at addressing where the current regime falls short and could be improved, rather
than mandating concrete recommendations.
There may be yet another explanation for the underplaying of corporate law tools in the
Guiding Principles, however. As documented above, corporate lawyers, particularly in the United
States, were able to participate extensively in the processes adopted by the Special
Representative. In the end, there appear to be signs of broad support for the Guiding Principles
from businesses and their lawyers, at least in the Western world. But this result was not
guaranteed, as evident from the reaction of one leading American law firm to Protect, Respect,
Remedy in 2008. In a memo dated May 1, 2008, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz concluded that
Protect, Respect, Remedy bore “significant, potentially harmful implications for global business”
and that it “requires close scrutiny by the business community” as it “will invite immense
pressure on corporations and their directors.”219 However, in what has been referred to as a
contribution to the “Millstein-Lipton Debate”, another leading American law firm issued a
contrary opinion shortly thereafter that was strongly supportive of Protect, Respect, Remedy.220
According to Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP on May 22, 2008, the “basic concepts embodied in the
Report are sound and should be supported by the business community in the United States” for
various reasons including that by “promoting the adoption of a regime of corporate respect for
human rights on an international scale, the Report would help bring many foreign firms to the
level of US companies, thereby eliminating the prospect of a competitive advantage arising out of
human rights abuses.”221 At the heart of this response was the sense that US companies were
already mandated by US laws or were voluntarily adopting practices of “high integrity in the
human rights arena.222
Strikingly, for the purpose of this chapter, on January 11, 2010, several months after the
Toronto Consultation, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz issued another memo to the Special
Representative explicitly hostile to the idea that Ruggie was considering recommendations for
states that there should be changes to corporate and securities laws.223 The memo highlights that
the proposals under discussion are designed to “advance human rights objectives “above and
beyond the requirements of local laws or existing business practices”.224 Consequently, they have
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the potential to “raise significant issues for corporations and their directors, ranging from the
conduct of annual meetings and director elections to board composition and corporate social
responsibility policies”.225 Moreover, the memo stresses that “in addition, they could open the
door to new types of litigation against corporations and directors.”226 However, by May 2010,
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz had had a change of heart: in a new memo and letter addressed
personally to John Ruggie, Martin Lipton and Kevin S. Schwartz described the Special
Representative as a “brilliant professor from Harvard” who “broke years of conceptual logjam in
2008” with Protect, Respect, Remedy.227 Based on participation in a recent consultation, the
authors indicated that they wished to identify two “critical issues concerning the corporation and
its board of directors” that needed to be addressed: first, that the work of the Special
Representative must be explicitly directed toward “every corporation around the world –
regardless of size, location, or line of business, and whether public or private”.228 Secondly, the
role of board of directors or other corporate governance organization “warrants particular
consideration”.229 To this end, they proposed that:
“expectations of the board of directors should draw on the well-established duty set forth
in the famous Delaware decision of In re Caremark (1996) and Stone v. Ritter (2006). In a
straightforward extension of the board’s existing duty to monitor corporate compliance
with criminal, financial, environmental, employee, and health and safety legal obligations,
the board of directors further would be expected to periodically review that the
corporations establishes and implements procedures reasonably designed to prevent
human rights abuses by the corporation and to take appropriate action to cause the
corporation to remedy any material violations that come to its attention, but beyond this
duty the board and its individual directors would have no responsibility or liability, such
responsibility being solely that of the corporation and its employees or agents committing
a violation.”230
By November 2010, as cited by the Special Representative in Cross-National Trends Study, Martin
Lipton had even more complementary words, describing the text of the draft Guiding Principles
as:
“insightfully marr[ying] aspirations with practicality. It identified a host of tangible
opportunities for Nations and businesses to contribute to the goal of preventing human
rights abuses … [It] does not raise issues of particular note regarding the liability of
corporations beyond their responsibilities under national laws, or the role of existing
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governance structures such as corporate boards. In short, Guiding Principles encapsulates
the Special Representative’s stated commitment to ‘principled pragmatism,’ reflecting the
world’s fundamental human rights expectations in a balanced way that takes account of
the varied, complex global business landscape.”231
What messages might we take from these submissions? The draft Guiding Principles
underwent an extensive public comment period, and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to
examine other submissions made by corporate counsel or other stakeholders. However, it is
interesting to note both the concern identified in these documents with avoiding increased legal
liability, and the underplaying of explicit legal recommendations in the final Guiding Principles.
The instinctive reaction to this observation might be to suggest that in the interest of courting the
corporate lobby, Ruggie caved in to their demands and weakened the potential for legal remedy
by underplaying the role of law. Yet, ultimately, for the corporate responsibility to respect to be
meaningful in practice for preventing human rights violations, it is clearly important that
corporate counsel take it seriously. There are signs that at least some of them are,232 although
others would argue that without legal remedy corporate counsel will not take it seriously for
long. On the other hand, despite the understanding of corporate counsel, it may be that, as Peter
Muchlinski has argued, there inevitably will be legal implications flowing from the due diligence
processes under the corporate responsibility to respect, with or without any explicit changes to
statutory corporate law.233
The overarching theme of this chapter is that if we are to take the business and human
rights agenda seriously, then consideration must be given not only to ensuring corporate
accountability after the fact of harm, but also to changing the nature of the corporate enterprise
from within so as to enable the prevention of harm in the first place. This chapter has evaluated
the extent to which the Corporate Law Project may have served as a tentative step toward this
goal. The Special Representative concluded the Cross-national Trends Study with these words:
“To the Special Representative’s knowledge, the CL project was the first in-depth, multijurisdictional exploration of the links between corporate and securities law and human
rights. The Special Representative hopes that it will encourage further scholarship moving
beyond the 39 jurisdictions considered in this project, as well as stimulate discussion
among the key actors involved, including human rights lawyers and advocates, corporate
and securities lawyers and experts, business representatives and government
regulators.”234

231

Corporate Law addendum, supra note 3 at 7 (para 7), citing Wachtell,Lipton, Rosen and Katz, online:
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/wachtell-lipton-rosen-katz-guiding-corporate-socialresponsibility-24-nov-2010.pdf
232
See, for example, International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), Human rights in the mining and metals industry,
Integrating human rights due diligence into corporate risk management processes (March 2012), online:
http://www.icmm.com/page/75929/human-rights-in-the-mining-and-metals-industry-integrating-human-rights-duediligence-into-corporate-risk-management-processes
233
Peter Muchlinski, “Implementing the New UN Human Rights Framework: Implications for Corporate Law, Governance
and Regulation” (2012) 22 Business Ethics Quarterly 145.
234
Corporate Law addendum, ibid at 44 (para 216).

28

This vision is one to be endorsed. Indeed, the Cross-national Trends Study identifies several
questions for future research in the course of its conclusions. For example, with regard to
directors’ duties, the following questions are posed:
“[W]hen directors are required or allowed to take the interests of non-shareholders into
account, up to what extent have they done so? Does litigation reveal that shareholders are
willing and able to bring suits against directors who may have declined a profitable
opportunity in order to respect human rights, or, conversely, for failing to consider human
rights when such failure causes reputational harm? What are the practical obstacles to
shareholders taking such actions? What are the implications of the fact that nonshareholders usually cannot take action for a breach of directors’ duties under corporate
law?”235
With regard to stakeholder engagement, the study concludes that while the template questions
touched on only three avenues of engagement, there are other mechanisms available, and the
Special Representative “encourages further exploration of the ways in which states may support
further dialogue between companies and their stakeholders on human rights”.236 These
represent a small sample of outstanding questions in relation to corporate law tools and human
rights.
Ultimately, it remains to be seen whether more creative visions of corporate law tools
could serve to re-imagine the corporate enterprise in more human rights friendly form. Even if
envisioned, it remains to be seen whether it would be pragmatically possible to turn these visions
into reality so as to change the nature of the current system. What is clear is that the reality of
corporate lawyer participation will make this task both easier and more difficult. Voluntary
participation in initiatives like the corporate law tools project is to be commended. Lobbying
against the promotion of state measures to fill global governance gaps in corporate accountability
is clearly less so. The question remains as to what extent corporate counsel will embrace the
corporate responsibility to respect in its current form, and if so, whether it will in fact serve to
prevent human rights harms so that the need for access to remedy might appear less urgent.
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